Digital-Sovereignty

The NetScaler zero-days raise a question that reaches beyond Citrix: when a national CSIRT warns some organisations before others, who decides who is worth protecting first?

Two NetScaler zero-days have Dutch hospitals and government taking their remote access offline, six years after the first Citrix-file. The patch is the easy part. The real question is why one appliance can hurt this much.

Broadcom’s removal of VMware’s VDDK shows why portability, not a paper exit plan, is what real infrastructure sovereignty requires.

A response to the NCSC Community piece on ‘open source, unless’, and why one line about transparency needing a watcher deserves more scrutiny than it got.

We haven’t just outsourced our hardware; we’ve outsourced our technical problem-solving capability. The ultimate sovereignty question: when the system fails, who is allowed to fix it?

The European Commission ran its infrastructure on AWS while writing sovereignty frameworks for everyone else. Now 350GB is gone. This was not a surprise.

A decade of Dutch digital sovereignty surrendered through procurement. From the failed Rijkscloud to the CLOUD Act, and now a state secretary who confirms it in writing and presses on anyway.

How collective IT negligence and geopolitical decisions expose systemic risks in digital sovereignty.

How EU policies, digital sovereignty, and cloud dependencies put member states at systemic risk.

The EU’s digital initiatives like CBDC and Chat Control raise questions about privacy, control, and IT workload.